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Executive Summary 
Several governments in developing countries heavily depend, either directly or indirectly, 
on the export of a few primary commodities for revenues. However the prices of these 
commodities exhibit both excessive short-term volatility and long-term decline. The 
booms and busts in commodity prices are asymmetrical both in duration and amplitude. 
For most commodities, busts tend to be longer in duration and higher in amplitude. 
These stylized facts of short-term and long-term commodity prices have several 
developmental impacts on commodity-dependent countries. In these countries, 
commodity price fluctuations culminate in cycles of booms and busts in government 
revenues. If government expenditures closely trace government revenues (i.e., an 
expansion in spending during booms and a contraction during busts), the result is 
fluctuations in government expenditure.  
The main developmental implications of pro-cyclical expenditures—i.e., those 
expenditures that closely trace revenues patterns—are, among others: “go-stop” public 
investments (over-ambitious projects during booms which may get abandoned during 
busts); excessive investment on hastily executed and low-return projects; expenditure 
entrenchment; debt accumulation; a loss of competitiveness in manufacturing (i.e., the 
Dutch disease effect); a weakening of institutions and systems that support innovation 
and entrepreneurial development; and weak transparency and accountability.  
Expenditure-smoothing through de-linking government expenditure from revenue is 
therefore critical. National revenue funds (NRFs) have been seen as viable mechanisms 
to do so. NRFs take two forms: stabilization funds (also called rainy-day funds) and 
savings funds (or future generation funds).1 Stabilization funds aim to smooth 
government expenditure by accumulating savings during booms to serve as a buffer 
against future price drops. Saving funds aim at accumulating savings for use by future 
generations. Botswana, Norway and Alaska have often been cited as countries and states 
that have used NRFs to successfully manage their resources. Not all examples are 
successes, though; countries such as Oman and Venezuela have used revenue funds in 
the past but have not prudently managed their oil revenue. This is mostly due to non-
adherence to NRF rules (including frequent changes to the rules).  
Several studies show that stabilization funds cannot on their own address the problems 
associated with revenue volatility. The key determinant for the success of NRFs is the 
political-economic environment in which they operate. In other words, the political-
economic incentives that governments face are central to how well revenue from natural 
resources is managed. Thus, the critical question in the design of an NRF is how to use 
the NRF as leverage to shape the political-economic incentives of governments. The 
model that the World Bank used in Chad was to impose a national revenue management 
law as loan conditionality. However, repeated breaches of the law by Chad and the 
government’s attempt to change the law and abolish the future generation fund, 
alongside recurring tension between the two parties, has already signalled that externally 
imposed models are difficult to sustain and typically doomed to fail.  
We agree with the view that, in countries where the political-economic incentives that 
governments face may not foster prudent revenue management, NRFs should not be 
used to impose optimal expenditure paths. In such countries, NRFs should instead be 
                                                 
1 A combination of these two types of funds is also common. 
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used as policy tools for re-aligning the diverging interests of governments, influential 
groups and society at large. We believe that nation-wide multi-stakeholder consultations 
are the way to go about it. We argue that recent advancements in democratization in 
several countries and increased internal and external pressures are among the reasons 
why multi-stakeholder consultations on resource management are feasible. We also argue 
that nation-wide multi-stakeholder consultations may pave the way for revisiting 
earmarked distribution patterns. Any multi-stakeholder consultation should target three 
important issues: establishing a national revenue management law which is acceptable to 
all stakeholders; establishing a multi-stakeholder independent oversight and monitoring 
committee to ensure checks-and-balances and compliance with the national revenue law; 
and giving the law constitutional status, to protect it from amendment or override by a 
single entity.  
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1. Introduction 
Many developing countries depend on the export of a few primary commodities for a 
substantial share of their revenue.2 However commodity prices are notoriously volatile. 
This is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows a century-long movement in long-term real 
prices (as adjusted by U.S. GDP deflator using the year 1900 as a base-year) for three 
groups of non-fuel primary commodities: food commodities; non-food agriculture 
commodities; and base metals.3 Two observations stand out for each group of 
commodities: long-term real commodity prices have been historically declining and 
prices exhibit short-term volatility.  
The figure confirms Deaton and Laroque’s (1992) observation that real commodity 
prices are often dominated by long slumps punctuated by sharp upward spikes. In other 
words, real commodity prices trend downwards in the long-term while interrupted by 
short-term volatilities.  
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia, Bulletin, April 2007 
Understanding the properties of short-term price volatility (i.e., the booms and busts) is 
important. In 1999, Cashin et al. examined the nature of commodity booms and busts 
for 36 non-fuel primary commodities. Two of their findings were: (i) for all but five of 
the 36 commodities (sugar (U.S. price), sugar (international price), beef, lamb and 
coconut oil), price busts lasted longer than price booms; and (ii) the magnitude of price 
falls in a slump is slightly larger than those of price rise in subsequent booms. The 
findings show that, on aggregate, commodity price booms and busts are asymmetrical 
                                                 
2 For example, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, in his report to the 58th session of the UN 
General Assembly, observed that as many as 38 developing countries are dependent on a single commodity 
for more than 50 per cent of their income, while 48 depend on only two (see at 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/57495/sgreport.pdf).  
3 These commodities are composed of 11 food commodities (bananas, beef, cocoa, coffee, lamb, maize, 
palm oil, rice, sugar, tea and wheat); seven non-food agricultural commodities (cotton, hides, jute, rubber, 
timber, tobacco and wool); and six metals commodities (aluminium, copper, lead, nickel, tin and zinc). 
Prices have been adjusted to reflect inflation. 
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both in their duration and amplitude. In terms of duration, the same study found that, on 
average, the length of a typical commodity price slump was over 10 months longer than 
the typical length of price booms, giving an average cycle (peak-trough-peak movement) 
of about 68 months (five years and eight months).  
Commodity busts cause a fall in government revenue. The extent of the fall is 
determined by the magnitude of the commodity price drop and the importance of the 
commodity in the government’s fiscal structure. The two prevailing trends in commodity 
prices have at least two major implications on the short-term export revenues earned by 
commodity-dependent countries. First, fluctuations in real commodity prices imply that 
commodity revenues fluctuate in the short-run with likely deteriorations in the long-run. 
Second, periods of lower revenue tend to dominate periods of higher revenue. This long-
term price decline is much higher when measured relative to prices of manufactured 
goods. This situation leads to a deterioration of commodity terms of trade, i.e., the 
purchasing power of a unit of commodity vis-à-vis a unit of manufactured good. World 
Bank estimates suggest that between 1970 and 1997 the decline in terms of trade 
deprived the non-oil exporting countries of Africa of an equivalent of 119 per cent of 
their combined annual gross domestic product in lost revenue.4 
 
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the major 
challenges associated with commodity price volatility and the challenges that 
governments in commodity-dependent developing countries face. Section 3 discusses the 
paradox of low economic growth in several resource-rich countries and highlights the 
causes of this paradox. Section 4 deals with the various policies put forth to address the 
paradox of growth in resource-rich countries. Section 5 discusses the role, from a 
theoretical angle, of national revenue funds (NRFs) as instruments for revenue 
stabilization and inter-generational equity. Section 6 identifies and briefly discusses the 
factors that determine the success or failure of NRFs, with an emphasis on the political-
economic incentives of government expenditure. In Section 7, we argue for nation-wide 
multi-stakeholder approaches to establishing national revenue management laws. Section 
8 provides a conclusion and recommendations.  
 
                                                 
4 World Bank, 2003. 
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2. Challenges of Commodity Price Volatility 
Excessive volatility of commodity prices has had severe developmental implications for 
commodity-dependent nations, with cycles of booms and busts in real national incomes 
creating problems for macroeconomic management.5 In several developing countries, 
exports of primary commodities contribute to a substantial share of government 
revenues directly (e.g., dividends and royalties) and/or indirectly (e.g., income tax and 
export tax). As a result, many governments in commodity-dependent developing 
countries face extremely variable revenues due to recurring phases of commodity booms 
and busts.6 This revenue instability can be short-term or long-term. Short-term 
instabilities are a result of drastic volatility of commodity prices. Concerns related to 
long-term instabilities arise for non-renewable commodities such as oil and gas, which 
are subject to depletion and cannot be indefinitely exploited. Renewable commodities are 
affected by long-term instabilities for two reasons. First, long-term prices for 
commodities relative to manufacturing tend to fall, and with them revenue earnings from 
those commodities. Second, some commodities, particularly raw material commodities, 
have increasingly faced the threat of substitution due to new scientific developments in 
biotechnology and nanotechnology.7  
Short-term revenue instability presents serious challenges for macroeconomic planning, 
particularly for fiscal policy management. If expenditure patterns follow revenue 
patterns, cycles of booms and busts in commodity prices get translated into cycles of 
booms and busts in fiscal expenditures. As a result, fiscal policy becomes pro-cyclical, 
implying that spending goes up (and taxes go down) in periods of booming prices and 
spending goes down (and taxes up) in periods of price busts. Such patterns of 
expenditure are common in developing countries,8 and are associated with poor fiscal 
management. 
The macroeconomic and fiscal policy challenges are further pronounced by the 
uncertainties surrounding the long-term sustainability of some natural resources. 
Countries that depend on the exploitation of non-renewable commodities, such as oil, 
gas and minerals, face a trade-off between current and future revenue. This implies that 
governments in non-renewable-commodity-dependent countries are not only faced with 
questions of inter-temporal budget constraints but also of inter-generational equity.9  
                                                 
5 See Mehrara and Oskoui, 2007; He and Westerhoff, 2005; and Dehn, 2001 
6 Humpreys and Sandbu, 2007.  
7 See South Centre, 2005. 
8 In a study conducted on a sample of 56 counties (20 industrial and 36 developing countries), Talvi and 
Végh (2005) found a positive correlation of 0.53 between government revenue and government 
consumption for developing countries, compared to a correlation of nearly zero for G7 countries and 
positive 0.25 for non-G7 industrial countries. The result shows that for every one dollar increase (decrease) 
in government revenue in developing countries, government consumption increases (decreases) by 0.50 
cents; in non-G7 industrial countries consumption changes by only 0.25 cents while government 
consumption in the G7 is almost de-linked from revenue. For more, see Sanchez de Cima, 2003; and 
Alesina and Tabellini, 2005. 
9 Inter-generational equity refers to the right of future generations to benefit from natural resources. 
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A government that depends on a few commodities for a large share of its revenue faces 
three critical challenges:10 
i. buffering itself from excessive short-term revenue volatility, i.e., short-term fiscal 
stabilization; 
ii. protecting the wider economy, in particular the manufacturing and agriculture 
sector, from contraction, i.e., Dutch Disease; and 
iii. establishing strong socio-economic institutions for economic and revenue-base 
diversification. 
In addition to these three challenges, governments will face two more critical challenges 
if the commodity which it depends on for revenue is non-renewable: 
iv. insuring itself against the long-term decline of revenue due to the likely depletion 
of resources, i.e., inter-temporal fiscal constraint; and 
v. ensuring inter-generational equity. 
                                                 
10 These are in addition to environmental concerns and concerns of conflict over control of mineral 
resources. 
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3. Natural Resource Wealth and Development 
Several studies have documented a strong negative correlation between economic growth 
and natural resource wealth.11 This negative correlation is often termed the “resource 
curse.” Nigeria, the world’s seventh largest oil producer, is often seen as one notorious 
example. As Weinthal and Luong (2006) documented: 
Its [Nigeria’s] government has accrued $350 billion in oil revenue since independence, and 
yet its economy has shrunk; in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, Nigeria’s GDP per 
capita was $1,113 in 1970 but only $1,084 in 2000, and during this same period, its poverty 
rate “measured as the share of the population subsisting on less than US$1 per day 
increased from close to 36 percent to just under 70 percent.  
The resource curse has been mostly studied in the context of booms in mineral 
commodities, particularly oil and gas. This is essentially due to two factors. First, oil and 
gas prices are more volatile than other commodities; Dehn (2001) found oil and gas 
prices to be twice as variable as those of other commodities. Second, mineral 
commodities such as gas and oil in general generate higher income than primary 
agricultural commodities, and are thus more alluring to rent-seeking behaviour. However, 
the difference in correlations of natural resource wealth and growth between mineral and 
non-mineral commodities is essentially one of degree. The factors that cause the resource 
curse are similar for all commodities and have to do with the management of the windfall 
revenues associated with commodity booms.  
Obviously, this is a paradox. Why would natural resource wealth be correlated with low 
instead of high economic growth, when higher revenue from natural resources might 
mean a relaxation of fiscal, savings and foreign exchange constraints? Several academics 
and policy-makers have pondered this question for decades. The general conclusion is 
that the resource curse is mainly a result of poor management of windfall revenues 
associated with commodity booms: the unwise use of large windfall revenues contributes 
to economic degeneration.  
The literature on development has vastly documented that commodity booms and busts 
are often badly handled.12 But while booms may not translate into sustained higher 
incomes, busts almost always cause long-lasting detrimental effects.13 In an important 
empirical study, Little et al. (1993) reviewed the experiences of 18 developing countries 
that experienced favourable terms of trade shocks (relative increases in their export 
prices) during the 1974 to 1989 period. The results show that these countries did not 
grow more than countries that experienced negative terms of trade shocks during the 
same period. There are two major causes for this: (i) the poor management of windfall 
revenues from the commodity booms and (ii) the loss of competitiveness in non-
booming industrial and agricultural sectors—a phenomenon known as Dutch Disease.14  
                                                 
11 See, Auty, 1998; Sachs and Warner, 1995 and 1997.  
12 See Gelb, 1988; and Bevan et al., 1989 and 1993. 
13 Collier, 2002.  
14 The term “Dutch Disease” originated in the Netherlands during the 1960s, when the high revenue 
generated by its natural gas discovery caused detrimental effect on the competitiveness of its other export 
sectors and deterioration in economic growth. 
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3.1 Poor management of windfall revenue from commodity booms 
Most governments find it hard to resist the temptation of spending windfall commodity 
revenues. This spending often fuels government expenditure on the current account and 
on low-return public investment programs. Competitive rent-seeking behaviour is, by 
and large, the engine that propels the spending binge associated with commodity booms. 
As the Economist (1995), cited in Talvi and Végh (2005), states: 
The trouble is that the lure of those fat rents can be hard to resist. The upshot is routinely 
an outbreak competitive rent-seeking. The power centre in any resource-rich country soon 
notice that the profits from capturing a slice of the rent from natural resources beat those 
of any possible alternatives…Experiences bears this out. In Mexico in the 1970s, 
politicians and firms battled over the state’s oil revenue. So it was in Venezuela, Nigeria, 
and several other big exporting countries. Nor is the experience restricted to oil exporters. 
Other resource-rich countries have blown the proceeds of their wealth in competitive 
rent-seeking: Australia and Brazil are outstanding examples. 
3.1.1 Expansion in current account expenditure 
Most governments, particularly in developing countries, operate on short time horizons. 
This leads them to seek to extend their tenure or enhance their image by expending 
windfall revenues on public consumption or the bureaucracy.15 Both democratic and 
authoritarian governments are generally pre-occupied with short-term political success, 
and most find it attractive to use windfall revenues for short-term political gains.16 Often, 
this involves an expansion of current account expenditures. In most cases, a substantial 
proportion of this expansion takes place in the form of higher salaries and wages, and 
current transfers and subsidies (on goods such as food, fertilizer or petroleum);17 for 
political reasons, it is often difficult for governments to reduce these expenses once the 
boom dies down. In other words, the expansion in current account expenditures tends to 
be less flexible downwards, and gets entrenched. This was the case in Sri Lanka following 
the mid-1970s and mid-1980s tea, rubber and coconut boom; in Malaysia following the 
early 1980s increase in petroleum price; and in Kenya following the coffee boom of the 
mid-1970s.18 In addition, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica and Cote d’Ivoire each saw 
public expenditure overtake revenues during the mid-1970s coffee boom.19  
3.1.2  Investment on low-return and over-ambitious projects 
Deaton and Miller (1996) observed that governments may squander windfall revenues on 
hastily executed programs that involve projects that earn a low return and are irreversible. 
Of course, a portion of the revenue increase from commodity booms may go to good 
public investment projects; the right kind of public investments are indeed desirable and 
needed. However, in many countries such investments involve over-ambitious projects 
that are abandoned halfway through when revenues decline. As the Economist (1995), 
cited in Talvi and Végh (2005), observes, most public investment projects associated with 
                                                 
15 Gupta and Miranda, 1991. 
16 Talvi and Végh, 2005. 
17 Gupta and Miranda, 1991. 
18 Tea, rubber and coconut accounted for bulk of Sri Lanka’s export earnings with tea alone accounting for 
two-third; petroleum accounted for a third of total export earnings in Malaysia in the 1980s; and coffee 
accounted for a third of Kenya’s export revenue. 
19 Little et al., 1993. 
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commodity booms in most countries were found to yield minimal, zero or, in few cases, 
even negative rates of return. Building on this observation, Talvi and Végh (2005) argue 
that such public investments should be viewed as falling essentially into the same 
category as government consumption, since non-productive investment will not generate 
future consumption.20 In essence, most of the public investment associated with the 
commodity booms ends up as “dead.”  
Three major factors may explain the low returns of public investment projects associated 
with commodity booms. First, because of competitive rent-seeking behaviour, a 
substantial share of public investment may find its way to projects that generate short-
term political gains to governments rather than to projects that generate high economic 
returns. Second, as commodity prices fall and revenues wane, good public investment 
projects may often get abandoned or take too long to complete. This “go-stop” nature of 
public investment is common in most developing countries where government revenue 
exhibits high variability. However, revenue variability per se is not the cause of this “go-
stop” nature of commodity boom associated public investment. It is rather the 
combination of the revenue variability and the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy—fiscal 
management in which government expenditures closely track revenues—that leads to 
poor management of windfall revenues. Both revenue variability and pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy are common in developing countries.21 Third, government agencies in charge of 
macroeconomic stabilization (typically ministries of finance) may lack control over 
government spending agencies. Spending agencies may include housing and urban 
development agencies, health and social welfare agencies, public works and 
transportation agencies. A lack of transparency and timely information on expenditure by 
the spending agencies also makes effective regulation difficult in developing countries.22  
3.1.3 Foreign debt accumulation 
Several governments tend to increase external borrowing on the strength of a booming 
commodity. Usui (1997) rightly dubbed this as “boom-based borrowing capacity,” 
because the borrowing capacity of booming countries might be improved drastically as 
they appear more attractive to lenders in donor countries. Hence, commodity booms in 
some countries fuel the debt accumulation process. In addition, governments may regard 
positive shocks as permanent and negative shocks as temporary. As a result they may 
tend to finance their deficit by borrowing when revenue starts to fall during busts. The 
debts often become unsustainable and debt servicing enormous when the bust hits and 
revenues fall.  
Mexico is a case in point.23 The oil boom of the 1970s and the tripling of oil production 
and exports allowed Mexico to reap immense profit; between 1977 and 1982, the country 
earned US$40 billion in oil revenues. This revenue was in turn matched by US$40 billion 
in foreign borrowing. By 1982, when oil prices plummeted and the world interest rate 
rose, almost 45 per cent of Mexico’s oil revenue went to service its external debt. During 
that same year, its current account deficit was an unsustainable US$10 billion, forcing 
Mexico to devalue its currency by 46 per cent. The unsustainable debt and current 
                                                 
20 For example, according to estimates, 75 per cent of public investment project in Nigeria associated with 
commodity booms are non-productive (Economist, 1995, cited in Talvi and Végh, 2005). 
21 See Talvi and Végh, 2005. 
22 See Premchand, 2000; and Kopits, 2000.  
23 See Library of Congress Country Studies, 1996.  
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account deficit finally precipitated to Mexico’s default and the country’s debt crisis.24 
This is not an isolated case. Nigeria found itself in a similar position in 2004; the 
country’s total external debt was over $35 billion, the largest debt burden in Africa.25 
With persistent fiscal deficits and access to foreign borrowing declining, governments 
such as these are forced to cut back on their expenditures. This often involves cuts to 
important social projects such as infrastructure, education and social health, and hurt 
economic development in the long run. 
                                                
3.1.4  Institutional weakening 
Large windfall revenues may also weaken institutions such as tax systems. This is 
particularly the case for commodities whose proceeds directly accrue into government 
coffers. Direct income from commodities can reduce the government’s incentives to 
establish robust systems and institutions for tax collection and tax-base diversification. 
Direct commodity incomes are less hassling and costly for the government, both 
economically and politically, than collecting tax revenue from the public. As a result, such 
governments depend less on taxes and their citizenry, and are therefore less pressed to 
provide for their needs.26 As Kalzuzhnova and Kaser (2005)27 observe, there is a degree 
of reciprocity between a government’s tax collection and the social services it provides to 
the business and the household sector; such reciprocity is often ignored by a government 
that exacts its dues from “gifts of nature.” Therefore, to the extent that commodity 
booms engender rent-seeking and patronage networks, they encourage little investment 
towards institutions of innovation and entrepreneurial development. 
3.2 Dutch Disease 
The second aspect of the negative terms of trade and poor economic performance 
associated with commodity booms has to do with what economists call the “Dutch 
Disease.” Dutch Disease refers to the diminishing competitiveness of a country’s 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors (i.e., sectors outside of the booming commodities 
sector) as a result of domestic currency appreciation in periods of commodity booms.28 
There are two channels through which Dutch Disease affects the export sector: the 
“spending effect” and the “resource movement effect,” 
3.2.1  Spending effect 
The spending effect refers to the shrinking of the export sector due to declining 
competitiveness, a result of the real exchange rate appreciation that is caused by 
commodity booms. The dynamics of this are different in flexible and fixed exchange rate 
regimes, but the effects are the same. The real exchange rate between two countries 
 
24 See Warner, 1993.  
25 See IMF, 2004. 
26 Instead, if the proceeds from commodity directly accrue to the producers/exporters, the government 
may have higher incentive to establish effective tax systems and institutions in order to generate higher 
revenue. In addition, the government will have the incentive to put institutions and systems that support 
and promote innovation and entrepreneurial development, since higher incomes to innovators and 
entrepreneurs means higher tax-base and therefore higher government revenue. 
27 Kalzuzhnova, and Kaser, 2005.  
28 Real currency appreciation is not necessarily restricted to commodity booms. It could be caused by all 
sources of capital inflow that substantially increase the domestic supply of foreign currency hence the 
demand for domestic currency. Such sources may include aid, foreign debt and foreign investment.  
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measures the price of a basket of goods and services in one country relative to a basket 
of goods and services in the other country. According to Krugman and Obstfeld 
(2003:411), the real exchange rate is “a broad summary measure of the prices of one 
county’s goods and services relative to the other’s.” In contrast, the nominal exchange 
rate is a measure of the relative price of two currencies.29 In other words, the nominal 
exchange rate measures how much of another country’s currency a unit of one’s currency 
buys.  
In flexible exchange rate regimes—where exchange rates are determined by market 
forces—real exchange rate appreciation happens through the appreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate. In commodity-dependent countries, nominal exchange rate appreciation 
can occur with an increased inflow of foreign exchange into the domestic economy as a 
result of a commodity boom. This drives up the value of the domestic currency (in terms 
of foreign currencies), and decreases the relative value of the foreign currency. As a 
result, a unit of foreign currency now buys less domestic currency, and therefore fewer 
domestic goods and services (with domestic prices remaining the same), than before. 
In fixed exchange rate regimes—where exchange rates are not allowed to vary with 
changes in demand and supply—real exchange rate appreciation happens through higher 
domestic prices, although the nominal exchange rate remains unchanged. The dynamics 
are as follows. The boom raises revenue due to the higher foreign exchange inflow. At 
the fixed exchange rate, there is now more cash to spend than before. As spending goes 
up, domestic prices increase. With higher prices for domestic products, a unit of foreign 
currency can now buy fewer goods and services in the domestic economy than it could 
before.  
In both cases, the real appreciation of the domestic currency—i.e., higher prices of 
domestic goods and services relative to foreign goods and services—weakens the 
competitiveness of the country’s exports. The danger is that even when the real exchange 
rate returns back to, or even below, its initial level after the price slump, it is difficult for 
a country to regain its competitiveness and lost market share.30 The temporary expansion 
in the non-tradables sector (see definition below) during a boom could permanently cost 
a country its competitive position for its goods and services in both domestic and foreign 
markets. 
                                                 
29 For more discussion, see Krugman and Obstfeld, 2003:411-420. 
30 This is mainly due to the existence of sunk-cost of market-entry (such as for example costs of 
advertising, market research and creation of marketing networks which cannot be recovered on exiting 
from market), a notion that economists call trade hysteresis. Hysteresis is a name given to an effect which 
remains after its causes are removed. High and unrecoverable entry-cost implies that once a firm enters a 
market it has a tendency to stay. A real exchange rate appreciation may cause foreign firms to enter 
domestic markets. The existence of large sunk-cost of entry means that the firms may not exit when the 
real exchange rate depreciates by equivalent unit. For detailed and technical discussion, see Baldwin, 1990. 
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3.2.2  The resource movement effect 
The resource shift effect refers to a shift of labour and capital from the production and 
trade of export goods—other than the booming commodity and in particular the 
manufacturing sector—into the non-tradables sector, mostly services.31  
The dynamics of this effect are that a portion of the higher revenues associated with the 
commodity boom may be spent on domestic goods and services. Studies show that 
governments have strong incentives to spend much of the windfall revenues on domestic 
non-tradables,32 on what are called “white elephant” projects. These grandiose and 
ambitious infrastructure and housing projects are often handpicked for political rather 
than economic reasons.33 As a result, the price of non-tradables increases relative to the 
price of tradables. Because the prices of tradable goods such as manufactured and 
agricultural products are determined on the international market, the increased demand 
for domestic goods pushes up the price of non-tradables like real estate.  
The result is that domestic relative prices are altered in favour of non-tradables. This in 
turn may imply, respectively, higher relative wages and profits for the labour and capital 
employed in the non-tradables. As a result, labour and capital may start to move out of 
industrial and agricultural sectors into the non-tradables sector. The extent of this 
movement depends to a large degree on factor mobility.   
                                                 
31 Non-tradable goods refer to goods that by their very nature cannot be profitably transported across 
borders. The sectors include transportation, real estate properties and tourism services such as hotels and 
recreation centres; these sectors are relatively less traded across boarders. 
32 Some examples of these include the man-made river in Libya, the largest airport in Saudi Arabia, 
mountain top resorts in Venezuela and the new capital city—Abuja—in Nigeria. 
33 See Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; and Eifert et al., 2002. 
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4. Preventing and Curing Resource Curses 
Several studies have been conducted on policy options for dealing with the resource 
curse. However, no consensus has been reached among observers and policy-makers. In 
fact, some observers are pessimistic about commodity-wealth—particularly mineral-
wealth—and regard it as an unconditional antecedent to poor economic growth.34 Other 
observers argue that with the right policies and institutions, resource abundance can be a 
blessing; they see the resource curse as not only preventable but also curable.35 The latter 
group of observers view political will by governments and functional institutions with 
transparency and accountability as critical factors for preventing and curing resource 
curses. However, there is no consensus even among this group about the specific set of 
policies that could create appropriate political incentives for the development of 
transparent and accountable institutions. 
Several policies and mechanisms have been put forth to deal with the resource curse. The 
most common ones include economic diversification; macroeconomic stabilization 
policies (such as avoiding excessive debt accumulation and avoiding investing beyond the 
domestic absorptive capacity); compensatory finance (such as the IMF compensatory 
finance fund and the EU’s STABEX and FLEX mechanisms); market-based risk hedging 
instruments such as futures and options; revenue stabilization funds (e.g., those 
employed in Botswana, Chile and Norway); and the direct distribution of resource 
revenues to citizens (e.g., the Alaska fund). The results of these interventions have been 
mixed at best.  
Economic diversification is the ultimate solution to the economic problems and shocks 
associated of commodity dependence. However economic diversification is a long-term 
process, and is thus not a fitting solution to the dire problems associated with short and 
medium term revenue volatility. Another intervention, the distribution of windfall 
revenues to citizens, may not be desirable to meet social objectives as it rests on the 
assumption that individual private citizens can save money or make investment decisions 
better than corrupt government bureaucrats.36 This may not necessarily be the case. In 
the past, compensatory finance mechanisms had limited scope of product coverage and 
were found to be ineffective; cumbersome bureaucratic procedures and ensuing delays in 
the reimbursement of funds made these mechanisms pro-cyclical rather than counter-
cyclical instruments.37  
Are NRFs any better to prevent and cure Dutch Disease and the economic setbacks of 
revenue variability? The remaining sections of this attempt to answer this question.  
                                                 
34 See, Auty, 1998; Sachs and Warner 1995 and 1997.  
35 See Beaulier and Subrick, 2006; Stiglitz, 2004 and Wright and Czelusta, 2002.  
36 See Collier and Gunning, 1996.; and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003.  
37 See Kairi Consultants Limited, 1994. 
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5. NRFs as Policy Tools 
NRFs are policy instruments that are intended to (a) insulate governments from the 
negative consequences of revenue variability and/or (b) to ensure inter-generational 
equity through saving part of the proceeds from non-renewable natural resources for 
future generations. In general, NRFs take two forms: “revenue stabilization funds”—also 
called “rainy day funds” (e.g., the Venezuelan Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund)—and 
savings funds, also referred to as “future generations funds” (e.g., Oman’s State General 
Reserve Fund, Kuwait’s Reserve Fund for Future Generations and Alaska’s Permanent 
Fund). Stabilization funds serve as a buffer against revenue drops, while saving funds are 
for use by future generations. Norway and Chile both have NRFs that combine 
stabilization and saving objectives. Savings could aim at accumulating wealth for use by 
future generations to ensure inter-generational equity (e.g., Chad, Kuwait), or saving the 
wealth for a pension fund (e.g., Norway).  
NRFs have been increasingly considered vital instruments for fiscal transparency and 
adherence to acceptable codes of fiscal management. The popularity of NRFs has 
recently grown with the establishment of national revenue laws in new gas producing 
countries such as São Tomé e Principe, Chad, Timor-Leste and Azerbaijan.38 The 
establishment of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) by the British 
government in 2002, the International Monetary Fund’s Guide on Resource Revenue 
Transparency39 and the Open Society’s A Guide to Monitoring Budgets and Oil and Gas 
Revenue40 all reflect the growing popularity of transparency and accountability in natural 
resource revenue management.   
The popularity of NRFs is partially inspired by the notable successes of countries like 
Botswana, a resource-rich nation that has managed to evade the resource curse. Since the 
discovery of large diamond deposits in Botswana in the 1970s, the country has achieved 
strong and stable real GDP growth at an average rate of over eight per cent.41 This 
healthy growth helped Botswana achieve a per capita income of US$4,500 in 2005, a far 
cry from its position in 1966 as the world’s 25th poorest country.42 Much of this success 
can be attributed to the fact that 80 per cent of the government’s reserves were invested 
in long-term assets through the country’s national revenue fund, the Pula Fund. 
Norway’s Petroleum Fund, the Alaska Permanent Fund and the Heritage Savings Trust 
Fund in Alberta (Canada) are other notable examples of the successful use of NRFs to 
wisely manage natural resource revenues.  
It is important to note that these governments are not the only ones with national 
revenue management laws in place; for example, both Venezuela and Oman have had 
NRFs for considerable periods. Why, then, have NRFs proved to be successful in some 
countries (Botswana, Norway and Chile, for example) and not in others? What lessons 
can be drawn from both the successes and the failures for the establishment of NRFs? 
                                                 
38 The adoption of an NRF in Chad was the result of World Bank insistence that Chad put in place a fund 
for future generations as a precondition for World Bank financing of the Doba oilfield development and 
the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project.  
39 IMF, 2005a.  
40 Shultz, Jim, 2005. 
41 IMF, 2006.  
42 Id.  
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Before addressing these questions, we will first review the logic behind national revenue 
funds.  
5.1 NRFs in theory  
Stabilization funds aim to cushion fiscal policy from short- and medium-term revenue 
volatility. This revenue variability, combined with the long-term trend among 
commodities towards declining terms of trade, makes stabilization objectives all the more 
important in commodity-dependent developing countries. It must be said that the funds 
themselves do not stabilize commodity prices. However, if they de-link government 
spending from volatile commodity revenues they could prevent commodity price 
volatilities from translating into macroeconomic (particularly fiscal) instability. 
At the heart of the fiscal stabilization objective of NRFs is the principle of expenditure-
smoothing: making government expenditures stable across revenue booms and busts. 
Thus, stabilization funds serve as counter-cyclical policy instruments for smoothing 
expenditures by financing public investment during price busts and saving during periods 
of price booms. For this purpose, stabilization funds have a set of rules that define when 
savings and withdrawals should be made.  
Stabilization funds may also be useful tools for an economy to avoid the worst effects of 
Dutch Disease. It does this if it caps the amount of windfall revenues that go into 
government coffers for spending. In effect, stabilization funds serve as an instrument of 
sterilization, an instrument that prevents the excess injection of revenues into the stream 
of government spending.  
NRFs may also help resource-rich countries prevent debt. Such countries often get into 
debt because their governments tend to treat commodity price booms as permanent but 
price busts as transitory. As a result, they tend to borrow during both. By cutting the link 
between expenditure and revenue, NRFs can discourage governments from borrowing 
on the strength of commodity booms.  
Similarly, savings funds may satisfy two optimal social objectives, particularly for non-
renewable natural resources. First, to the extent that large savings are accumulated, such a 
fund could ensure cash for public investments long after the resources have been 
depleted. It may thus avoid, or at least reduce, the aforementioned “go-stop” public 
investments. Second, savings funds may ensure inter-generational equity, as they imply 
that current generations will not be able to consume all of the revenue generated from 
the exploitation of the given commodity. NRFs in Norway, Oman and Alaska require 
that their savings be invested in safe securities to generate additional income for future 
use.  
By restricting the share of windfall revenues that goes to finance government 
expenditure, NRFs induce governments to establish and strengthen the tax 
administration. In Chad, for example, the oil revenue management law allows only oil 
revenue from taxes to go to the general budget for discretionary spending by the 
government (see Box 1). All remaining revenue is earmarked to “priority poverty 
reduction” sectors, to the development of the oil-extraction region and to the Future 
Generation Fund. According to the agreement, if the Chadian government wishes to 
increase its spending, it has to raise additional revenue from non-oil sources. It thus has 
to strengthen its tax system and diversify its tax-base.  
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In short, properly designed and enforced NRFs may help to cushion an economy from 
macroeconomic instability, avoid possible contractions of the tradables sector and ensure 
inter-temporal budget optimization, inter-generational equity and the effective 
development of economic institutions for revenue-diversification. Some aspects of a 
good NRF design include: clear criteria for saving and spending; built-in mechanisms for 
ensuring compliance, for preventing discretionary law amendments and releases of 
funding by governments; and transparency of both revenue and expenditure.  
Box 1: The structure and operation of selected NRFs 
i. Chad’s National Revenue Management Law 
In 1999, after the discovery of oil in Duba, Southern Chad, the government and the World Bank 
signed an agreement under which the Bank provided a loan of US$39.5 million to finance Chad’s 
share in the Duba oil fields and the Chad-Cameroon pipeline.  
As part of the agreement, the government of Chad accepted—as conditionality to the loan—a 
petroleum revenue management law. Under the law, all receipts from oil are deposited in an 
“escrow account” in London. The revenue from taxes collected will then be directly transferred 
from the escrow account to the government’s treasury. Ten per cent of royalties and dividends is 
saved in a “Future Generation Fund” and invested in long-term investment portfolios, with the 
remaining 90 per cent transferred into a “special revenue account” in a private commercial bank 
in Chad, in the name of Chad’s treasury.  
The law earmarked 80 per cent of royalties and 85 per cent of dividends for “priority poverty 
reduction sectors”: health and social affairs, education, infrastructure, rural development 
(agriculture and livestock), and environment and water resources. In addition, five per cent of 
royalties are allocated to poverty reduction in the petroleum-producing southern region of Chad. 
Finally, the remaining revenue (i.e., 15 per cent of royalties and dividends) is channeled to the 
general government budget for discretionary expenditure. After December 2007, this portion will 
be used to finance priority poverty reduction sectors.  
The use of petroleum revenue by the Chadian government is subject to monitoring by a 
petroleum oversight committee (Collège de Contrôle et de Surveillance des Ressources Pétrolières). In 
addition, the government’s spending program for “priority poverty reduction sectors” needs to 
be approved by the oversight committee before funds are released from the special account. The 
committee includes representatives of the government, parliament, supreme court and civil 
societies.  
According to the original agreement, the government of Chad is not allowed to amend or waive 
the petroleum revenue management law. However, in December 2005 the Chadian government 
passed legislation to do just that; the proposed amendment would expand the share of royalties 
and dividends that go to the government budget from 15 to 30 per cent. It would thereafter 
include expenditures on defence and eliminate the future generation fund, with an immediate 
transfer of the US$37 billion in the fund to the general government budget for expenditure. The 
proposed amendment was strongly opposed by the World Bank and by domestic and 
international civil society. The Bank responded in January 2006 by suspending the disbursement 
of US$124 million in loans to Chad, and froze the country's US$125 million in assets in the 
London escrow account. Following the suspension, the World Bank and the Chadian 
government entered into a series of negotiations which led to the signing of a memorandum of 
understanding in July 2006 between the two parties. According to the memorandum, Chad 
agreed to commit 70 per cent of its budget spending to priority poverty reduction programs, and 
provided for long-term growth and opportunity by creating a stabilization fund. However, 
overall, the agreement led to a decrease in savings for both the future generation fund and for 
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poverty reduction in the oil-producing southern region, and accorded a larger share of oil 
revenue to the government.43 
ii. Azerbaijan’s State Oil Fund 
The State Oil Fund of the Azerbaijan Republic was established in 1999 by a Presidential decree 
with the purpose of revenue stabilization and saving for future generations. According to the 
national revenue management law, the President of the Republic has the ultimate authority over 
all aspects of the Oil Fund’s activities, including the approval of investment programs and 
budget, the formation of an investment strategy and selecting auditors for the annual audit. The 
President also has the power to liquidate and re-establish the Fund’s regulation and management 
structure, which has three levels: the President, an Executive Director and a Supervisory Board. 
The Supervisory Board consists of 10 government officials and two members of parliament, and 
oversees the composition of the Oil Fund’s assets and compliance of expenditure rules. The 
President has the authority to appoint and dismiss the Executive Director and Members of the 
Supervisory Board.  
The Oil Fund’s expenditure rules allow the government to invest in projects of national 
importance. However, no clear criteria for the selection of these projects have been developed. 
Additionally, the President has the authority to amend the Oil Fund’s budget in case of the 
loosely-defined “pressing necessity.” This leaves wide room for the President to amend the Oil 
Fund’s budget. The fact that ultimate power over all aspects of the Fund’s operation lies with the 
President gives little confidence for the sustainability of the Fund and its ability to de-link 
revenues from expenditures.  
One positive development in Azerbaijan’s oil revenue management system is its signing of the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in November 2004. The signing was 
between the government of Azerbaijan, foreign and local oil companies and a coalition of some 
32 local non-governmental organizations. The EITI urges governments to disclose the revenue 
that they receive from companies and for and companies to disclose all payments they make to 
governments. Thus, Azerbaijan’s signing of the EITI fosters a certain degree of revenue 
transparency. The country published its EITI first report, which was audited by independent 
auditors, in March 2005, thereby becoming the first country to do so under the initiative (British 
Embassy Baku Press Release, 2005). Since then Azerbaijan has reported four times under the 
EITI, most recently in January 2007. The EITI does not, however, publish information on 
spending—which for Azerbaijan remains opaque.  
iii. Alaska’s Permanent Fund and Constitutional State Reserve Fund44  
Alaska has two separate revenue management funds: the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) and the 
Constitutional Budget Reserve Fund (CBRF). Both funds were approved as amendments to the 
state constitution. The APF was founded in 1976 as a trust to future generations. It aims to save 
a portion of oil revenues to create an investment base that generates income for future 
generations, who will see the natural resources depleted over time. Alaska’s constitution requires 
that at least 25 per cent of all mineral lease rentals, royalties, royalty sale proceeds, federal mineral 
revenue sharing payments and bonuses received by the state be deposited into the APF. This 
must happen regardless of the oil market and the state’s fiscal position. These rigid requirements 
have been criticized as major shortcomings for stabilization.  
The APF has two components: principal and income. The principal is the permanent component 
of the fund. Any expenditure from the principal component requires a vote by the people. In 
addition to saving and investing for future generations, since 1982 the APF has allowed for the 
                                                 
43 See Afrol News, 2006.  
44 This section intensively draws from Mahmudov, 2002.  
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distribution of a portion of the oil revenue to state residents. From 1982 to 2001, the Fund paid 
US$11 billion to citizens. In 2001 alone every Alaskan resident received about US$1,850 from the 
dividend program. This has reduced the savings that the state could have achieved both for 
stabilization and inter-generational equity purposes.  
A second fund, the CBRF, was founded in 1990 with a goal of supplementing government 
revenue shortfalls. The constitutional amendment that created the CBRF requires the state to 
deposit all proceeds from settlements of tax and royalty disputes between the state and oil 
companies; in 2002, this amounted to US$240 million. The CBRF serves as an interest-free loan 
to the budget that must be repaid in years of fiscal surplus. Its assets can be appropriated for any 
public purpose by a vote of three-fourths of the members of each house of legislature. 
5.2  The empirical evidence on NRFs and fiscal stabilization 
 
The empirical evidence on the effects of NRFs on expenditure-smoothing and fiscal 
stabilization is ambiguous. For example, based on time-series data, Davis et al. (2001) 
found that government expenditures are less related to revenues in countries with NRFs 
than those without. This result was found to be true on average with variations across 
countries. However, measures of causality show that the funds did not have an 
identifiable impact on government spending. This suggests that countries with more 
prudent expenditure policies tend to establish NRFs, rather than NRFs leading to 
increased expenditure restraint.45 Similar results were found by Crain and Devlin (2002).  
 
Fasano (2000) examined the NRFs of Norway, Chile, Alaska, Venezuela, Kuwait and 
Oman and found mixed evidence in terms of the effect of NRFs on fiscal discipline, 
showing that there is a “difficulty in adhering to the operation rules [of the NRFs].” 
Based on this finding, Fasano concluded that stabilization funds cannot be a substitute 
for fiscal discipline; the author underlined that stabilization schemes have been more 
successful in countries with a strong commitment to fiscal discipline and sound 
macroeconomic management.  
This brings out a fundamental issue with regards to NRFs: that the most popular 
solutions to the resource curse, of which NRFs are one, have had little success partly 
because they presuppose strong state institutions, which are absent in most of the 
developing world.46  
Both Fasano (2000) and Weinthal and Jones Luong (2006) have attributed the 
experiences of resource-rich countries that succeeded in achieving fiscal discipline and 
inter-generational equity through stabilization and/or savings funds to their ability to 
prevent their governments from altering the budget or rules of the NRFs. Botswana’s 
success in de-linking expenditures from revenues has been attributed to its requirements 
for parliamentary approval for any new public project.47 Conversely, less successful 
experiences in Venezuela and Oman can be attributed to the frequent changes to fund 
rules and deviations from its intended purposes.48 Humphreys and Sandbu (2007) 
attributed Chad’s dismal fiscal management to the Chadian government, which preferred 
to change the rules of its fund than to adhere to them (see Box 1). As a result, strong 
legislative restrictions on governments discouraging overspending and the altering of 
                                                 
45 Davis et al., 2001; and Devlin and Lewin, 2005. 
46 Weinthal and Jones Luong, 2006. 
47 See Weinthal and Jones Luong, 2004; Eifert et al., 2001; and Beaulier, S. A., Subrick, J. R., 2006. 
48 Fasano, 2000. 
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fund rules are seen as critical factors for the success of NRFs. That said, the Norwegian 
NRF makes such general conclusions impossible.  
As Humphreys and Sandbu note, the Norwegian Fund imposes extremely weak 
restriction on policy-makers. Despite this, Norway has managed to achieve fiscal stability 
with high levels of savings. One reason for this is that the political system in Norway 
fosters transparency, making politicians aware of the political costs that imprudence in 
fiscal management would bear, particularly come election time. The country’s stable and 
democratic political system also engenders long-term fiscal policies—a characteristic 
often associated with an incumbent government’s confidence that successive 
governments will not substantially deviate from current spending patterns.49 
As, UNCTAD (2006) succinctly puts it: 
 
Stabilization funds have generally, but not always, failed. There has been no discernible 
impact on government spending, no avoidance of price shocks including Dutch disease 
effects, and so on. In countries such as Oman and Venezuela, frequent changes to rules 
and deviations from objectives led to their funds’ failure. In Alaska, easy access to the 
stabilization fund to boost the population’s income postponed a response to the state’s 
structural problems: falling oil production and inability to develop other sectors. In other 
countries, funds intended for earnings stabilization were simply no longer there when the 
need for stabilization came, as politicians had found other uses for them. 
Two key lessons can be drawn from the empirical evidence:  
i. the establishment of an NRF on its own does not necessarily guarantee prudent 
fiscal policy and does not necessarily ensure inter-generational equity; and  
ii. NRFs are ultimately ineffective, even when designed perfectly, if robust 
institutions for ensuring a governments’ strict observance of the fund’s rules are 
absent. Political will and commitment to prudent revenue management by 
governments are critical.  
                                                 
49 Theoretically, this can be expressed as a policy choice faced by an incumbent who knows that they will 
be in power for successive periods. Humphreys and Sandbu (2007) theoretically showed that such an 
incumbent has the incentive to choose the optimal spending path that efficiently satisfies the inter-
temporal budget constraint. In contrast, the incumbent will choose a different spending path if they face a 
high risk of being voted out of office and replaced by a successor with a different expenditure plan. 
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6. The Determinants of the Successes and Failures of NRFs 
NRFs in most developing countries are commonly afflicted by technical, institutional and 
political weaknesses.50 These weaknesses are often inter-linked. However, well-designed 
NRFs may contribute to transparency and good fiscal policy by setting benchmarks 
against which governments may be assessed. 
The design and operation of NRFs play an important role in their effectiveness as policy 
tools for stabilization and inter-generational equity. The design refers to the rules that 
govern how the NRF is operated and administered. Crucial to this are the nature of 
institutional development and the political system in which the NRF operates. The 
institutional aspect refers to the strength of regulatory institutions of transparency and 
monitoring that are necessary for the effective operation and administration of an NRF. 
The political conditions refer to the political will of governments to abide by the NRF 
rules and the extent to which the political system enforces those rules on the 
government.  
In most authoritarian states, where checks and balances are generally absent, NRFs are 
often poorly designed and are under the direct or indirect control of governments. Such 
is the case in Azerbaijan (see Box 1). Due to the President’s complete control over the 
operation of the fund, its effectiveness and sustainability are doubtful. In such countries, 
the establishment of NRFs may not be a guarantee for expenditure-smoothing and inter-
generational equity. Moreover, these countries often design NRFs only for external 
political consumption—particularly for claiming fiscal responsibility and spending 
transparency.  
Box 2: Scandal in oil revenue management in Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan established a National Oil Fund in January 2001 by Presidential decree. From the 
beginning, the Kazak government reiterated that the oil revenue would not be spent to cover 
current expenses, but would be accumulated in the Oil Fund to meet future needs and serve as 
a buffer against revenue drops. However, it did not take long before a scandal broke out; it 
was eventually revealed to Parliament that Kazakh authorities had transferred the proceeds of 
the sale of Kazakhstan’s 20 per cent share in the Tengiz oilfield to a secret account in 
Switzerland. The Tengiz oil field is now majority-owned by ExxonMobil and Chevron; 
ExxonMobil has been implicated by two grand juries in the United States over bribes and 
other scandals in its dealings with Kazakhstan.  
See, Mahmudov, 2002, and Eurasia Insight, 2007. 
Political systems determine the degree of checks-and-balances—and hence transparency 
and accountability—in revenue management. In turn, political systems tend to be 
reinforced by the distribution patterns that they create. This can create a vicious cycle 
between political-economic incentives and rent management. NRFs, when well-designed 
with unambiguous savings and withdrawal mechanisms, can foster transparency and 
accountability, and may bring governments into the public spotlight. Thus, NRFs may 
influence the way governments manage windfall revenues and serve as benchmarks 
against which governments can be assessed. This depends on clarity, however. Had 
Chad’s oil revenue management law been unclear, it would have been much more 
difficult to ascertain the extent to which the government’s proposed amendment 
                                                 
50 See Birdsall and Subramanian, 2004; Eifert et al., 2002; and Davis et al., 2001.  
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deviated from the original agreement’s rules. Without clear benchmarks, pressure on the 
World Bank from civil society groups asking for the suspension of aid to Chad and the 
freezing of transfers from the escrow account may not have been forthcoming. 
The international community could play a role in designing NRFs in countries with 
relatively weak political transparency. And while the EITI is a positive step towards 
improving transparency and accountability, it remains concentrated on mineral receipts; 
how countries spend their mineral revenues remains opaque. More can be done to 
encourage reporting in this area.  
6.1 Common design problems in NRFs 
NRFs in some developing countries are afflicted by poor design. The most common 
types of poor designs are described below. 
6.1.1 Savings-based rather than expenditure-based NRFs  
Typical NRFs require a certain percentage of commodity revenues be saved either for 
fiscal stabilization objectives or for future generations. And while governments could 
respect the “words” of NRF rules by putting aside the required share in a savings or 
stabilization fund, they can defy the fund’s objectives by continuing to spend, through 
borrowing and using the money available in a savings/stabilization fund as collateral. As 
a result, a country with a savings fund could simultaneously, and somewhat paradoxically, 
accumulate both savings and debt. Future generations would then inherit debt and 
savings simultaneously. In effect, saving funds that do not directly restrict government 
expenditures in periods of high prices achieve little to nothing in terms of accumulating 
net savings for fiscal stabilization and inter-generational equity. As Fasano (2000:11) 
observes, the government of Venezuela “managed to accumulate resources into the fund 
consistent with the rules governing the fund, [but] such an accumulation was financed 
through government borrowing as the overall fiscal position remained in deficit in 1999.”  
6.1.2 Failure to target the minimum revenue generation for fiscal deficit 
financing from sources other than natural resources  
Poor design is not limited to savings-based stabilization funds alone. Expenditure-based 
stabilization funds face similar problems if they focus on limiting the aggregate fiscal 
expenditure without setting limits on the maximum annual non-natural resource fiscal 
deficit. In other words, the fiscal rules should target the extent to which other sources of 
revenue such as taxes contribute to the government’s budget. Countries such as Norway 
and Botswana have recognized the importance of targeting budget contributions from 
non-natural-resources. Norway’s fiscal guidelines require that the non-oil government 
budget deficit be equal to the long-run real return on the assets of the Government 
Petroleum Fund (which in 2005, for example, was expected to be four per cent) (See 
IMF, 2005b).51 Similarly, Botswana’s government has attempted to expand non-diamond 
revenues; in 2003, it passed an Income Tax Amendment Bill to enhance enforcement 
and compliance under the Income Tax Act. In the same year, it extended withholding 
taxes to rental incomes from immovable property, to dividend incomes for all 
companies, and to interest incomes received by residents.52 The cumulative goal of these 
                                                 
51 IMF, 2005b. 
52 AFDB and OECD, 2004.  
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initiatives is to increase the government’s tax collection and thereby reduce its 
dependence on diamond revenues.  
6.1.3  Poor investment strategy  
NRFs typically carry with them investment rules, with many even going as far as 
identifying specific financial securities for investment purposes.  
Several countries invest a portion of their stabilization fund savings in U.S. treasury bills. 
Countries choose U.S. treasury bills because of their liquidity (short-term maturity) and 
low risk. It is desirable for countries to avoid engaging in very risky investment securities. 
A more desirable investment strategy combines investments in high return equities and in 
low-risk bonds. This implies investing a proportion of the savings in high-return stocks, 
while moderating the risk by investing the remaining savings in low-risk bonds. This 
combination helps to take advantage of high-return investments while moderating the 
overall risk of the investments. A good example of this is Norway’s strategy (see Box 3). 
Norway aims to reap high financial returns by investing 40 per cent of the savings in its 
Fund in high-return equities, while moderating the risk by investing the remaining 60 per 
cent in fixed-income instruments. An additional moderation of risks could be achieved 
by investing in equities that are negatively correlated to the fiscal risk that a country 
faces.53 For example, if a country that depends on oil for its revenue invests in securities 
which are negatively correlated with oil—in airlines, for example—it will obtain a low 
return on its investment when oil prices are high. However when oil prices are high, oil-
producing countries do not need to rely on their investment income. It is when oil prices 
decline that negatively correlated investments become important—for their returns will 
increase as the commodity’s price decreases. As a result, the investment yields low return 
when the country is not in need of the money and high return when it needs it, making 
these counter-cyclical investment strategies more desirable for expenditure-smoothing.  
Box 3: Norway's Investment Guidelines 
 
? The aim of the investment strategy is to achieve high financial returns subject to 
moderate risk. 
? The Fund is only invested abroad in financial instruments, and acts as a financial 
investor with a small ownership share in individual companies. 
? The Fund’s financial results are primarily assessed in international currency terms, in 
order to gauge the development in the Fund’s international purchasing power. 
? Equities account for 40 per cent of the Fund's strategic benchmark portfolio, 
consisting of equities listed on exchanges in Europe (50 per cent), America/Africa (35 
per cent) and Asia/Oceania (15 per cent). The Government has announced plans to 
increase the equity allocation to 60 per cent. 
? Fixed income instruments account for 60 per cent of the strategic benchmark 
portfolio, consisting of fixed income instruments issued in currencies from Europe (60 
per cent), America/Africa (35 per cent) and Asia/Oceania (5 per cent). Plans are for 
the fixed income allocation to be reduced to 40 per cent. 
 
Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/FIN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/Fact%20sheet%20Pension%20Fund%2
0-%20Global.pdf 
                                                 
53 See Rigobón, 2006. 
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6.1.4 Saving in national banks and investing domestically 
Another common weakness in the design of NRFs in countries like Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan is the accumulation of the funds in national banks instead of escrow 
accounts and the investment of a substantial share of the fund in domestic securities.  
National banks in politically unstable countries are often threatened by radical political 
change; international banks are not affected by such events. Therefore holding NRFs in 
international banks is more desirable not only for transparency in administration of the 
funds, but for cushioning the fund from internal political pressures and radical political 
changes. Similarly, investing NRFs in domestic securities may not necessarily be 
desirable, particularly for developing countries. First, in most developing countries, 
security markets are underdeveloped. Second, the choices of securities may be limited 
and may often result in a substantial portion of the investments going towards the low-
return equities of inefficient state enterprises. Often, these investment decisions may 
have more to do with political patronages and rent-seeking behaviours than with the 
performances of the enterprises. Sao Tome e Principe, Norway and Chad are a few of 
the countries who invest their natural resource proceeds abroad.  
6.2 Political incentives and institutional problems 
In NRF formulation, design is one but not necessarily the most important determinant 
for expenditure-smoothing. Equally important are the political incentives that 
governments face in their fiscal expenditure choices, and the institutional environment in 
which they make the choices. The situation is akin to a constitution. Almost all countries 
in the world have constitutions. However, many governments do not respect their 
constitution and often act contrary to its word and spirit. The key challenge is therefore 
not merely in the drafting of a “perfect constitution” but properly implementing and 
enforcing it.  
Strong and independent institutions for monitoring and enforcing government adherence 
to NRF rules are absent in most developing countries.54 As a result, these governments 
can ignore the NRF rules and use the funds for their short-term political interests.55 A 
perfectly-designed NRF will not automatically change the political incentives of 
governments. As Humphreys and Sandbu (2007) argue, when the political incentives for 
spending are overwhelmingly strong, an NRF is useful only insofar as its institutional 
procedures improve the political incentives facing policy-makers. As such, policy-makers 
have to consider the political and economic context when designing NRFs, or risk the 
tool’s ineffectiveness.  
The most fundamental question for policy-makers in natural resource-rich countries is 
therefore how to design NRFs that can alter the political incentives of governments. In 
order to appreciate and understand the critical role of political incentives in revenue 
management, it is often useful to undertake a comparative analysis of the political 
incentives that governments in countries with successful and unsuccessful records of rent 
management have faced. Such an analysis provides insight into the political-economic 
incentives that blocked overspending in successful natural-resource-rich countries, and 
how their absence results in poor revenue management in others.  
                                                 
54 Weinthal and Jones Luong, 2006. 
55 See Eifert et al. (2001) for detailed discussion and specific examples.  
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6.2.1 Political systems and fiscal spending in selected countries 
In an attempt to identify the factors that have helped some countries effectively manage 
their oil revenues, Eifert et al. (2002) documented the political-economy forces that 
shape fiscal policy and expenditure patterns across oil-exporting countries with widely 
differing political systems.56 Political incentives vary across countries with different 
political systems, and lead to differences in natural-resource revenue management 
systems. Eifert et al.’s analysis shows that the effective management of natural resource 
revenues is often a result of favourable political incentives.  
The success of Norway and Botswana has been attributed to their stable and democratic 
political systems. These political systems have fostered long-term decision-making 
through a broad consensus on key aspects of economic policy, including the use of 
windfall revenues and transparency and accountability.  
For both countries, stable political systems dominated by a few parties (that do not 
primarily depend on charismatic leaders but rather on party reputation) combined with 
highly consensus-oriented, transparent and accountable parliamentary institutions to 
provide incentives for long-term decision-making on expenditure patterns. In addition, 
the presence of strong pro-stabilization constituencies in the form of employees, trade 
unions, business leaders and voters dependent on the non-oil tradables sector serve as a 
counter-balance to incentives for spending.57  
By contrast, factional democracies like Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela, countries 
under military rule like Nigeria (from 1966 to 1999) and “predatory autocracies”58 like 
Chad have poorly managed their oil revenues.59 The primary reasons for this are the 
absence of effective constituencies that restrain and smooth government spending, and 
political systems characterized by instability and patronage networks.  
In such countries, more value is attached to patronage networks than to political 
reputations as means for obtaining and sustaining political power. As a result, 
government expenditure policies have short time-horizons and prioritize sustaining 
short-term political supports. The patronage networks, when combined with weak 
institutions of transparency and accountability, serve as disincentives for restraint on 
fiscal expenditure. These patronage networks often include powerful interest groups such 
as the army, politicians and government technocrats. In Ecuador and Colombia, for 
example, the revenue share of each interest group, including the military, has been 
earmarked in the budget (see Box 4), entrenching certain fiscal expenditures. This deep 
                                                 
56 This section substantially draws from Eifert et al., 2002. 
57 Norway has the history of deciding expenditure patterns through a multi-stakeholder consultation. For 
example, in 1986, a commission composed of representatives from all political parties, labour, business 
groups, government officials and experts, through a multi-stakeholder consultation decided new policy 
guidelines that ensure the use of fiscal policy for counter-cyclical purposes. In the consultation, labour and 
business leaders agreed to wage moderation (see Eifert et al., 2002).  
58 Predatory autocracies are often defined as “state power that faces few constraints and the exploitation of 
public and private resources for the gain of elite interests is embedded in institutionalized practices with 
greater continuity of individual leaders. Such regimes are non-transparent and corrupt—little financial and 
human capital flows into productive occupations, whose returns are depressed by a dysfunctional 
environment” (see Ganesan and Vines, 2004). 
59 For detailed discussion see Eifert et al., 2002. 
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entrenchment means that any attempt to improve transparency in budget allocation and 
fiscal expenditure reform meets strong oppositions from the powerful interest groups.60 
Box 4: Earmarking in Ecuador 
In Ecuador, despite a weak non-oil tax administration and high volatility in revenues, about 65 
per cent of total tax revenues (including all oil revenues) were earmarked for specific programs 
or for transfers to sub-national governments in 1999. The earmarking system illustrates the 
strength of Ecuador’s network of entrenched interests vis-à-vis the unstable central 
government. Its complexity and non-transparency has produced unforeseen and irrational 
distributions of oil revenue, the major beneficiaries of which have historically included the 
inefficient and overstaffed bureaucracy of PETROECUADOR, the military, and the civil 
service (World Bank, 1991). 14.5 per cent of all oil revenues were earmarked directly to the 
military in 1989, and 67.6 per cent were allocated to finance the public wage bill and other 
programs, notably the rural roads program, a politically important source of patronage. 
Earmarking in turn reduces the fiscal flexibility of the central government, locking in spending 
increases during oil windfalls and forcing drastic cuts in operating and discretionary 
expenditure during downswings. 
Adopted from Eifert et al., 2002. 
 
                                                 
60 In factional democracies and predatory autocracies, riots and strikes have been common responses that 
governments that attempt to reform transparency and fiscal spending face. The kidnapping of President 
Febes Codero of Ecuador by military paratroopers in 1987—which lead to the reversal of the process of 
reform—and the strong pressure that President Lusinchi of Venezuela faced from organized labour and 
business opposing his fiscal reform packages of 1984 are two examples.  
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7. A Nation-wide Multi-stakeholder Approach for National 
Revenue Management Laws 
As discussed, NRFs do not necessarily guarantee prudent management of windfall 
revenues. This was clearly stated by Davis et al. (2001), who underscored that national 
revenue funds are neither an easy nor necessarily appropriate solution to the fiscal policy 
problems faced by natural-resource-rich countries. In most natural resource-rich 
countries the absence of effective political-economic incentives for prudent fiscal 
management are the primary causes for poor revenue management. How to influence the 
political-economic incentives of governments in such countries is a critical challenge.  
Of course, there is no “one size fits all” answer to these questions; each case is unique, as 
the political-economy incentives differ from one country to another. Hence, no one 
model can be “copied” from one country and “pasted” on another. Therefore, each 
country should undertake its own assessment and establish the model that best fits its 
political and economic reality.  
7. 1 The predicament of imposed models of national revenue management law 
In countries where the political economic incentives do not foster prudent revenue 
management and with entrenched, influential interest groups who are reluctant to accept 
changes in the rent-sharing status quo, the ideal national revenue management law may not 
be one that imposes a socially optimal expenditure path. That path was, however, sought 
by the World Bank in its dealings with Chad, and was not entirely successful. The process 
of implementing an NRF suffered hiccups along the way and led to continuous tensions 
between the two parties. However, Chad’s revenue law was initially hailed as a model for 
other countries. Is the model sustainable? Can it be replicated in other countries like 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Venezuela?  
As an imposed model, it is unlikely that Chad’s NRF is sustainable. This became evident 
early on, with the government’s repeated attempts to re-write the conditions of the fund 
and discard the Future Generation Fund. Imposed models also raise questions of 
sovereignty: should the World Bank exercise a paternal role and impose “discipline” on 
“bad governments” by the use of “carrots and sticks”? Can World Bank experts better 
run country development programs from their offices in Washington, D.C.? In the 
context of the Bank’s mixed reputation in many of the countries it seeks to help, these 
questions become more pertinent.  
7.2  Nation-wide multi-stakeholder consultation as an alternative 
In our view, the best alternative is to craft an NRF through a nation-wide consultation 
process. The aim should not be to identify the economically optimal spending path but 
rather to define a mid-point among the interests of government, influential interest 
groups and society at large. In other words, in countries where political economic 
incentives sterilize socially optimum spending rules, an NRF should opt for a second-
best outcome.  
In order to achieve this outcome, the national revenue management law should be 
drafted on the basis of a nation-wide multi-stakeholder consultation in an open and 
transparent process. This consultation should aim at three important issues: establishing 
a national revenue management law which is acceptable to all stakeholders; establishing a 
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multi-stakeholder independent oversight and monitoring committee in a way that ensures 
checks-and-balances and compliance with the national revenue law; and giving the law a 
constitutional status to ensure that no one entity can amend or waive the law.  
7.2.1 Incentives for a nation-wide multi-stakeholder consultation 
What incentive do governments and powerful interest groups have in accepting a nation-
wide multi-stakeholder consultation if it means constraining their discretionary power in 
revenue management? Again, there is no simple answer to this question—it all depends 
on the political stability of the country. For one, governments may find it worthwhile to 
compromise their discretionary power for achieving political and social stability; as 
Collier and Hoeffler (2005) note, rent distribution is a major cause of conflict and social 
unrest in several resource-rich countries. Secondly, several resource-rich countries have 
achieved notable improvements in democratization, increasing the chances for 
governments and influential interest groups to accept a nation-wide multi-stakeholder 
consultation as a viable mechanism. Thirdly, political pressure from the international 
community and civil societies—such as Open Society’s initiative on transparency and 
accountability—could push parties in the required direction. The World Bank, for 
example, could have asked Chad to initiate such a nation-wide multi-stakeholder 
consultation to carve out a national revenue management law. The Bank could have 
secured a seat in the consultation as an observer, or as a stakeholder by virtue of its 
lender status in the establishment of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline.  
7.2.2 Key elements for the multi-stakeholder consultation process 
The first step for the consultation process is to establish a multi-stakeholder drafting 
committee, formed with representatives from government (parliamentarians and 
representatives from regions where the natural resource is extracted or grown), civil 
society representatives, representatives of interest groups such as labour unions and the 
military, and ombudsmen to represent the interests of the public. It may be useful to also 
include non-voting observers such as representatives from international organizations. 
During the consultation, the media (both private and public) should be given access to 
the consultation and all documentation, and should be allowed to objectively report to 
the public. This would ensure the fairness of the process that establishes the national 
revenue management laws.   
A nation-wide multi-stakeholder consultation for drafting the natural revenue 
management law may pave the way for revisiting earmarked distribution patterns. It 
would also ensure the establishment of a revenue law that will be accepted and legitimate 
for multiple stakeholders. Once drafted and agreed to at the national level, the law should 
be included in the constitution. Any amendment to the law must then require a 
constitutional amendment with a majority vote by parliament or by public vote, as 
appropriate. Giving the revenue management law constitutional status, rather than 
marking it a governmental decree, could be a strong deterrent to any unilateral attempt to 
change the law.  
The design of the NRF should, inter alia, require that all revenue associated with the 
natural resource in question, including taxes, dividends and royalties, go to the NRF 
account. This would improve the tracking and transparency of revenues. In addition, the 
law should require that transfers from the NRF be on an annual basis and only be made 
to the government budget. All payments to interest groups, such as the military, should 
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be incorporated into government budget; in other words, there should not be multiple 
channels of transfer from the NRF. This is critical to ensure transparency and to monitor 
compliance with the NRF laws. The government’s budget should be annually approved 
by a parliament. The NRF rules should also require periodical publication of transactions 
to and from the NRF, and require that the government sign into the EITI in order to 
promote transparency.  
The establishment of a multi-stakeholder independent oversight committee is also 
crucial. The committee should work under the auspices of the parliament and should: 
have the right to investigate disbursements under the NRF; have access to all relevant 
documents related to revenue management; and be able to suspend transfers from the 
NRF to the budget should it find sufficient evidence of major non-compliance with the 
NRF rules. Members of the oversight committee should be appointed by parliament and 
should include non-voting observers from international organizations, national 
ombudsmen and UN ombudsmen. The non-voting members could ensure that the 
independence of the oversight committee is respected by the government and other 
stakeholders, and that it discharges its responsibility effectively. The UN ombudsmen 
may have the advantage of attracting media attention, and hence could be a factor for 
compliance to the NRF rule.  
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8. Conclusion and Recommendations 
NRFs do not necessarily guarantee prudent management of windfall revenues, 
particularly in countries where political incentives in favour of long-horizon fiscal policies 
are weak or absent. In such countries, it is possible to have an NRF that prescribes 
socially optimum expenditure and saving patterns (i.e., the best policies for fiscal stability 
and inter-generational equity). However, the major challenge is how to ensure that 
governments in such countries adhere to the socially optimum expenditure patterns of 
the NRFs. In addition, NRFs cannot be substitutes for democracy, transparency and 
accountability. Their effect on fiscal policy is limited to the extent to which they affect 
political incentives in favour of transparency and accountability, the preconditions for 
long-term decision-making. In general, the prudent management of windfall revenues 
and political systems cannot be separated. Often, the degree of prudence in fiscal policy 
has a strongly positive correlation with levels of democracy, transparency and 
accountability. 
As Humphreys and Sandbu (2007) rightly argue, in many countries the rationale for 
NRFs must not be to identify and prescribe socially optimum expenditure and saving 
patterns but instead to be a vehicle for institutional solutions that alter the political-
economic incentives that governments face, so that their expenditure patterns are re-
aligned to socially optimum paths. There is no one simple methodology to ensure this. In 
general, national revenue laws in such countries should result from nation-wide multi-
stakeholder consultation processes that aim to revisit existing patterns of spending, 
including expenditure earmarked to influential interest groups, and to lock in, through 
constitutional amendment, the national revenue management law. This should be 
reinforced by establishing a multi-stakeholder oversight committee to monitor the 
operation of the fund and suspend any transfers from the NRF that do not comply with 
the fund’s rules.  
In general, commodity-dependent countries use a combination of instruments and 
strategies for the short-term stabilization of commodity prices and the direct distribution 
of investment returns to citizens. As such, NRFs should only be used where they are 
believed feasible. For the purpose of fiscal stabilization, NRFs should be expenditure-
based and should target maximum levels of fiscal contributions from outside of its 
natural resource revenues. Such funds should have prudent investment strategies which 
include investing in low-risk securities that are negatively correlated to the risks 
associated with the major commodity resources upon which the countries depend. With 
careful design and thoughtful implementation, NRFs can then become one of the tools 
available to commodity-producing countries for tackling the volatile incomes which 
naturally derive from their chief exports. And with this comes the chance for economic 
development and, for many, a movement towards stability and prosperity.  
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